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A B S T R A C T
Land law reform through registration and titling is often viewed as a techno-
cratic, good-governance step toward building market economies and depoliti-
cising land transactions. In actual practice, however, land registration and
titling programmes can be highly partisan, bitterly contentious, and carried
forward by political logics that diverge strongly from the market-enhancing
vision. This paper uses evidence from Côte d’Ivoire to support and develop
this claim. In Côte d’Ivoire after , multiple, opposing political logics
drove land law reform as it was pursued by successive governments representing
rival coalitions of the national electorate. Between the mid-s and , dif-
ferent logics – alternatively privileging user rights, the ethnic land rights of
autochthones, and ﬁnally a state-building logic – prevailed in succession as
national government crafted and then sought to implement the new 
land law. The case underscores the extent to which deeply political questions
are implicated in land registration and titling policies.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Land law reform via registration and titling continues to be viewed by
many as a technocratic, good-governance step toward building liberal
market economies and depoliticising land transactions. In actual imple-
mentation, however, land registration and titling programmes have
often been driven by very different priorities and dynamics. In the
African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and
others, recent land law reforms that promote formalisation of land
rights have been used in partisan, starkly redistributive, and sometimes
politically explosive ways. In these settings, land law reforms have
often been as much about extending and consolidating political
power as they are about limiting the state and freeing markets. In
some situations, they have been as much an ampliﬁer of social conﬂict
as a solution to it.
Léonard et al. (: ) argued that in the domain of land policy
reform in Africa, political logics and control strategies often determine
the course of change. This paper extends their argument, using the case
of Côte d’Ivoire to show how regime change at the national level pro-
duced dramatic national-level shifts in the content, political purposes,
and political uses of land law. Different logics – alternatively privileging
user rights, the ethnic land rights of autochthones, and ﬁnally a state-
building logic – prevailed in succession from the mid-s to .
Even with a new land law in  that aimed at land certiﬁcation and
titling, the politics around national strategies of implementation were
at odds with liberal visions of market-building and individualisation.
In Côte d’Ivoire from themid-s to , each change in the locus
of political (partisan) control at the national level produced reversals in
the thrust of land policy. Reversals were visible in the government’s strat-
egies to advance the land rights registration and titling agenda; in village
delimitation and decentralisation strategies; and in legal adjudications
of land law. This paper traces these shifts in national priorities, under-
scoring the deeply partisan thrust of land law reform in each era and
in the larger state-building purposes that land law was harnessed to
serve.
The analysis is organised chronologically. Part I is a brief overview of
the pre-reform era, the s to the early s, when land policy under
the country’s ﬁrst president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was a ‘land-to-the-
tiller’ (or user-rights afﬁrming) policy that was designed to promote
land-pioneering in the zone of the rapid expansion of export-crop
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production. Houphouët’s death in  set in motion a reconsideration
of Ivoirian land policy.
Part II centres on mid-s pilot projects aimed at promoting the
eventual registration (and perhaps titling) of landholdings. These
took place amidst the national-level power struggles of –.
Power struggles found expression in a new land law, Law –,
which contained an array of potentially or inherently conﬂicting provi-
sions for assigning land ownership rights on the basis of autochthony
(i.e. by conﬁrming customary land ownership claims), and then dissolv-
ing these away under a World Bank-inspired individualisation and titling
plan. Opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo, with an electoral base in the
Ivoirian centre-west, was the leading national champion of the auto-
chthony-afﬁrming provisions of Law –.
Part III tracks the efforts of the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, who came
to power in , to realise the autochthony-afﬁrming promise of Law
–. Land activism under the Gbagbo government was aimed expli-
citly at replacing the Houphouëtist land regime with a land regime that
asserted autochthonous communities’ land ownership rights over those
of migrants. The empowerment of autochthonous communities was
to be conﬁrmed through a sweeping political and administrative
decentralisation.
Part IV shows that after the fall of the Gbagbo regime in , his suc-
cessor, Alassane Ouattara, turned the tables once again in the land
domain. The Ouattara government, with a power base in the Ivoirian
north and among the northern diaspora of migrants in the southern
Côte d’Ivoire, neutralised the anti-migrant thrust of the land law. In its
ﬁrst term (–), Ouattara’s government used the provisions of
the  land law to promote the recentralisation of power, and to
extend and deepen the state’s presence in war-torn localities along
Côte d’Ivoire’s turbulent borders in the far western regions of the
country. In –, the government opened the doors to
demand-driven registration and titling of land in a -mile radius
around Abidjan, but did not invest political capital in pursuit of the
land privatisation agenda.
The paper contributes to knowledge about land politics in general
and Côte d’Ivoire in particular by offering a national-level, political ana-
lysis of land policy since . It ﬁlls a gap between two different litera-
tures on Côte d’Ivoire since , one on politics and the other on land
use. Political analysis in the s focused mostly on the national crise
socio-politique that brought Gbagbo to power, crystallised in a 
rebellion, divided the country into a government-controlled south and
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rebel-controlled north for ﬁve years (in a situation of ‘neither peace nor
war’), and culminated in disputed elections in  and Gbagbo’s
removal from power by rebel forces aided by the international commu-
nity in . The fundamental role of land issues and of the 
land law in precipitating the crisis is a prominent theme in these
studies. Yet there has been very little scholarly analysis of the Gbagbo
government’s efforts to actually deliver on the promise of Law –
in the government-controlled south in the – period, or polit-
ical analyses of land policy under Ouattara during his ﬁrst term in
ofﬁce (–). Indeed, much political science commentary
conveys the impression that the  land law and its political promises
were swept away in the chaos of the crisis and war years. A separate
stream of research on post- Côte d’Ivoire focuses on micro-level
changes in land use and land contracting in the Ivorian south. This
work tracks bottom-up drivers of change in the export-crop producing
smallholder sector. It treats the  land law as mostly non-implemen-
ted in the – period, with the important exception of the sharp
uptake in land titling opportunities by members of the national urban
elite in the region around the capital city of Abidjan.
The analysis here begins to ﬁll these gaps. It draws upon local news
reports, grey and secondary literature, Ministry of Agriculture internal
documents from – and – that were consulted in
Abidjan by the author. The record of land policy activism and its links
to reforms of local governance structure during this period have not
yet been described or analysed in the scholarly literature on Côte
d’Ivoire. Approximately  unrecorded semi-structured interviews with
actors in the Ivoirian land administration sector in  and  (in
Abidjan and Bouaké) provided background information to supplement
the document-based analysis.
The Ivoirian experience is signiﬁcant for understanding contempor-
ary land law reform in African countries (Boone ). It shows how
land law reform initiatives aimed at land registration and titling can
have domestic political drivers and effects that are only partially or
even tangentially related to liberal visions of land privatisation, commo-
diﬁcation and market-making. At the same time, it is a strong corrective
to political science analyses that insist that partisan competition for state
power in African countries is about ethnicity and patronage only, and
void of real, programmatic stakes. In Côte d’Ivoire the opposite is the
case: struggles over land law have been intertwined with partisan
conﬂicts, electoral struggles, and actual battles over the national trajec-
tory writ large.
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I . L A N D L A W I N T H E P R E - R E F O R M E R A
In the pre-reform era, from s to the early s, land policy under
Félix Houphouët-Boigny was designed to promote land-pioneering in
the region of rapid expansion of export-crop production in the coun-
try’s centre-west and south-western forest zones. Above all, it enforced
user rights in this zone (i.e. upholding the rights of whoever was using
the land, even if the users had no ancestral claims to it). In doing so,
land policy promoted the land pioneering interests of the ethno-
regional groups who were represented by the Houphouët regime, i.e.
the Baoulé of central Côte d’Ivoire and the northerners with whom
they were allied within the ruling Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire
(PDCI). Baoulé and northern farmers and farmer-traders vigorously
colonised the south-west forest zone with active state support and
backing. To achieve this, Houphouët built a strongly authoritarian
and centralised state which repressed indigenous groups (and their cus-
tomary land claims) in the south-west. A voluminous literature docu-
ments and analyses this process.
I I . L A N D L A W I N N O V A T I O N A N D R E F O R M I N T H E     S
Côte d’Ivoire was one of four francophone West African countries to
begin implementing a Plan Foncier Rural (PFR) project in the late
s. With active support from the World Bank and the French
Cooperation, the PFR envisioned a process of deﬁnition of village terri-
tories and lands (terroirs villageois), registration of land rights, creation of
the institutional framework necessary for the eventual conversion of cus-
tomary rights into statutory land rights, and land use planning at the
village level. In western Côte d’Ivoire, land pressure was mounting,
along with political tensions between autochthones and in-migrants
over land rights. The general economic conjuncture contributed to
rising social and political tension around land. The mid-s were a
time of economic recession, shrinking employment and IFI-imposed
austerity which choked off growth of the cities and sent the middle
class into a tailspin. In response to recession and ﬁscal austerity,
unemployed urban youth began to ‘return to the land’, but many who
returned to the western regions found that in-migrants now occupied
most of their families’ land. One proximate goal of the PFR in the
west, as least as far as the Ivoirian Ministry of Agriculture was concerned,
was to release some of this pressure by identifying underutilised tracts of
land that could be made available to unemployed youth. Around Soubré
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in the south-west, plans to build a new dam on the Sassandra River
created a separate need to survey local populations and landholdings
which dovetailed with some of the proximate objectives of the PFR.
Between  and the end of , the larger political context also
shifted. Côte d’Ivoire returned to multipartyism in , and in ,
Houphouët died and power passed to his hand-picked successor,
Henry Konan Bédié. During this period, the PFR progressed in ﬁve
pilot zones. About , ha of village land was mapped, with village
boundaries and existing land rights traced out on the basis of local inter-
views: Béoumi (, ha), Korhogo (, ha), Abengourou
(, ha), Soubré (, ha) and Daloa (, ha) (Chauveau
et al. : ). In January , the PFR matured into the
Programme National de Gestion des Terres Rurales (PNGTER), with a wider
mandate and a greater emphasis on individual titling per se (see
Stamm ).
The very process of ‘village land surveys’, the basic tool in the PFR
toolkit, stoked tensions in the central and western parts of the Ivoirian
forest zone. Surveys asked village elites and household heads to inven-
tory their landholdings, and to specify who owned what, who had
gained access to the land via whom, and who had rights to stay on or
dispose of the land. This unfolded in the context of intensifying parti-
san competition and political polarisation at both the local and the
national level. Conﬂict was especially acute in the centre-west and
west, where politicians from the ruling PDCI and their newly unleashed
partisan rivals, organised in the centre-west by Laurent Gbabgo under
the banner of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), instrumentalised indi-
gene-stranger tensions to mobilise rival electoral constituencies. The
political, economic and social climate deteriorated. In the  elec-
tions, as the PFR ‘pilot’ phase was coming to an end, , in-migrants
(most of them Baoulé) were expelled by grassroots militia from the
Gagnoa area in the Ivorian centre-west (Babo & Droz ). A large
scholarly literature analyses this difﬁcult history.
As land tensions and partisan struggle intensiﬁed, the World Bank
pressured the Côte d’Ivoire government to move forward on a land
policy aimed at registration and titling as part and parcel of ‘second gen-
eration structural adjustment’ reforms. Politicians and representatives
from the regions most affected by land-related tensions (the centre-
west, south-west and south-eastern coastal zone around Bonoua)
became actively involved in formulating and ‘sensibilising’ populations
around reform proposals, seeing promise and risk for themselves and
their constituencies in the prospect of a major new land law.
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In December , the ruling party, the PDCI, introduced a new land
law that would largely supersede the PFR and the PNTGER. It aimed at
titling and registration, and unleashed bitter controversy. In National
Assembly debates, the ruling party was split by the proposal to conﬁrm ‘cus-
tomary rights ceded to a third party’ as property rights that could be regis-
tered and titled. PDCI delegates from the west joined the inﬂamed
opposition party, Gbagbo’s FPI, in protest. The FPI saw this clause as a
green-light to those who would dispossess autochthonous westerners of
their land rights. Suspension of National Assembly deliberations gave the
FPI time to compose a counter-proposal that (a) inserted a nationality
clause into the law (reserving the right of property ownership to Ivoirian
nationals) and (b) vested the power to conﬁrm the initial allocation of
land ownership rights in autochthonous elders at the village level. This
satisﬁed the FPI and other members of parliament from the west who
had opposed the ﬁrst version of the law, and were intent on ensuring
that guardians of autochthones’ interests would have a strong hand in
determining how the new law was implemented at the local level. Some
observers remember that some Ivorian legislators were very concerned
to block or pre-empt large-scale sales or concessions to foreign (non-
African, corporate) investors. Meanwhile, the law received some support
from deputies who wanted to create a path to registration and titling to
facilitate private acquisition of land and investment in agriculture.
Law – is remembered as having passed unanimously, but if it did
so, it passed in a very divided parliament. Some deputies apparently
began to renounce it as soon as it was passed. One analyst reported
that ‘The Baoulé lobby opposed it’ (Boni n.d.). If this is true, it is not
surprising: the law dramatically weakened the position of in-migrants
to the centre-west and south-west, be they Baoulé, Ivoirians from the
north, or foreigners. Implementing decrees (décrets d’application) were
promulgated on  October .
There was an upsurge in assertiveness of autochthones around land
rights in the centre-west and far west. A dramatic expression was
the November  expulsion of Ivoirien northerners (Lobi) and
Burkinabe from Tabou. This was followed by the military coup d’état
of  December , mounted by junior ofﬁcers claiming to represent
disaffected northerners. A new military regime under General Robert
Guëi was installed. The violent expulsions of non-indigenes from the
west and widespread social destabilisation set off by the passage of the
new land law contributed indirectly to this outcome. Guëi was displaced
by Gbagbo less than a year later in the ﬂawed presidential election of
October .
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I I I . L A N D P O L I C Y U N D E R T H E G B A G B O R E G I M E : S C A L E S T I P P E D
D E C I S I V E L Y I N F A V O U R O F A U T O C H T H O N E S
The  land law overturned a status quo in which the government
enforced the principle that working the land (mise en valeur of the
land) was the source/origin of land use rights. The new law was
widely interpreted as mandating ﬁrst registration of all unregistered
rural land (approximately % of the national territory) in the name
of autochthonous owners – this was to happen throughout the national
territory within a period of  years. It reversed Houphouët’s legacy of
enforcing the primacy of user rights in the most dynamic zones of
export-crop production in the centre-west, south-west and far west,
and thus represented dramatic inversion of the rapports de force
between in-migrants and autochthones in these regions. At the end of
the -year registration period, all unregistered land was to become
the property of the state.
Much commentary holds that Law – was not implemented or
never implemented. This statement is true in a narrow sense: by
, only a miniscule number of land certiﬁcates had been issued
for rural landholdings. Implementation more broadly understood,
however, entailed concerted activism on the part of the Gbagbo
regime to prepare the ground for implementing the  law, and to
seize the possibilities for an autochthonous rights revival that the law
seemed to authorise. Under Gbagbo, government policy aimed at trans-
forming rapports de force between indigenes and migrants. Its thrust and
intent were visible in three domains: (a) court cases; (b) the delimitation
of village boundaries and the setting up of land rights-based political
hierarchies within and among villages, and issuance of Certiﬁcats
Fonciers (land certiﬁcates); and (c) efforts to pursue political and admin-
istrative decentralisation. Each is discussed below.
The scope of these efforts was limited in geographic and ﬁnancial
terms, largely due to the politico-military crisis of – and its
aftermath, followed by the ﬁnal defeat of the Gbagbo regime in .
Even so, we see in these efforts a concerted attempt to use Law
– to afﬁrm autochthonous land rights and embed these in a
larger political and legal order that gave primacy to the local.
Court cases
As Dagrou (: –, –) recounts systematically, the auto-
chthony-afﬁrming content of Law – was stridently asserted in a
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series of court cases between  and , notably from Daloa, a
strongly pro-Gbagbo region. A June  court case in Cour d’Appel
de Daloa ruling reads that ‘given the law – holding that only les
populations autochtones riveraines (in a locality) have use rights, we can
deduce that such rights can never result from a simple mise en valeur,
and above and beyond that, a non-Ivoirian foreigner who, under the
terms of the law just cited, is not destined (n’a pas vocation) to become
the owner of a parcel of rural land’. In , the Tribunal de
première instance at Abengourou ruled on the ‘nullité absolue’ of a sale
contract that has not been notarised. The Cour Suprême followed up,
issuing in December  an Arrêt conﬁrming that no customary land-
holder has the right to cede property rights to a third party, even if
the sale is notarised, further closing the door on legal recognition of
past sales to non-autochthones. The Daloa court speciﬁed in June
 that ‘customary rights in no way proceed from the mise en valeur
of the land’.
In April , a Sassandra ruling, conﬁrmed in Daloa, went to the
Cour Suprême which ruled that mise en valeur confers no customary use
right (much less property right), and that the true property holder in
the disputed case is the one who exercises customary rights ‘sur la parcelle
de ses ancêtres par voie de succession, comme la consacre la loi n. – du 
december ’. In June  the Daloa court proceeded to nullify
notarised land sales and expel occupants from litigated parcels. In April
 the very active Daloa court also ruled that informally documented
sales (acte sous-seing privé, presumably what are called ‘petits papiers’ in the
land literature) are ‘absolument nulle’.
Village boundaries, village hierarchies, and issuance of CFs
In , the PNGTER was extended for the – period. This pro-
gramme, run by the Ministry of Agriculture and the prefectoral corps,
took up the project of delimiting and demarcating village territories.
Although Law – did not lay out procedures for village delimitation,
delimitation was a precondition for the formation of village land commit-
tees (CVGFR) with authority to assign land rights within territorially
demarcated units. For the Gbagbo government, the stakes in village
delimitation were three-fold: formalising and ofﬁcialising the primacy of
autochthonous land rights; creating ofﬁcial village hierarchies which
gave primacy to state-recognised autochthonous villages; and giving
state recognition to ‘naturalised’ village origins and boundaries. Village
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and landholdingmappingmethodology was adapted from the procedures
developed in the s under the PFR. Issuance of land certiﬁcates fol-
lowed from this and was underway in Gbagbo’s last four years in power.
The ﬁrst part of this sub-section describes this procedure, and the
second analyses the patterns that emerged.
Gbagbo regime demarcation and registration procedure
The point-of-departure in delimiting village territories was the existing
structure of territorial administration, in which the ‘village territory’ is
the lowest-level administrative jurisdiction. Its political and administra-
tive centre is the state-recognised village (village propre, or village érigé
[erected] by the government), and the lowest-ranking agent of the terri-
torial administration (subordinate to the sous-préfet) is the chief of the
ofﬁcially recognised village. The village territories demarcated in the
PNGTER exercise measured between , and , ha in size
(, ha = . square miles) and typically contain multiple, hierarchic-
ally ranked settlements. The ofﬁcially recognised village is the seat of
power with the village territory, and other settlements, often referred
to as campements (camps) in Ivoirian parlance, are politically and admin-
istratively subordinate to (rattaché à) it. Administrative ideology and
protocol is based on the idea that village territories are customary, histor-
ical or natural political homelands of some set of original inhabitants. In
zones of in-migration, the campements or villages rattachés are settlements
created by non-autochthonous ‘outsiders’ who settle with the permission
of the indigenous local land authorities and the administrative chief. The
in-migrants create their own, separate settlements within the village ter-
ritory, at a distance from the villages propres. A land ownership hierarchy is
thus embedded in ofﬁcially recognised village hierarchies.
One of the stakes in the PNGTER delimitation and registration exer-
cises was recognising or reforming pre-existing village hierarchies in the
project zones. A campement or village rattaché that is granted proper
village status (érigé en village) is ‘liberated’ from its former overlords,
now holds land autonomously in its own right, and has its own village ter-
ritory. Conversely, to lose village status and to be demoted to the status of
a village rattaché is to be subjected to the authority of another group, and
to have land access only with the permission of those who do control
land with the village territory.
In the PNTGER project zones under the Gbagbo government, the
state-led process of village delimitation, hierarchisation and land certiﬁ-
cation pivoted on the pervasive and long-maintained ‘political-
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administrative distinction between ‘autochthones’, on the one hand,
and ‘allochtones de nationalité ivoirienne’ and ‘allogènes non-ivoiriens’, on
the other hand’ (Chauveau & Colin ). The hierarchical structuring
of villages and appointment of village chiefs was pre-decided, usually
following the status quo but, as we shall see, not always. In advance of
village surveys, sous-préfets organised the formation of Comités Villageois
de Gestion de Foncier Rural (CVGFR, or Village Land Management
Committees), presided over by the sous-préfets, who were to act as reposi-
tories of local knowledge about village histories, village boundaries, the
allocation of customary land rights within village territories, and the
granting of derived land rights to village outsiders. According to the
PARFACI report (Varlet et al. : ), –% of the members of
the CVGRF constituted in the  exercise were autochthones, includ-
ing members of the chefferies (see also Colin : ). This is one indi-
cator of the government’s decision to throw its weight behind
autochthones and a neocustomary vision of landownership.
With CVGFRs in place, an enquêteur appointed by the state was brought
in to develop an ofﬁcial historique de la constitution du village using a -
item questionnaire, working in the presence of the CVGFR and other
knowledgeable persons, and ofﬁcialising the procès-verbal with the signa-
tures of all CVGFR members. The next step entailed actually deﬁning
village boundaries, publicising the proposed boundaries in the village
(and in neighbouring villages, the sous-préfecture ofﬁce) to collect objec-
tions and endorsements, resolving disaccords, ofﬁcialising village bound-
aries, placing boundary-markers and publishing an ofﬁcial map of the
village limits.
Issuance of Certiﬁcats Fonciers and Certiﬁcats Fonciers Collectifs (CFCs) was
to follow. CFCs were envisioned as instruments that would document
extended family holdings, but would have a lifespan of only  years.
Then the land would have to be divided up and registered and titled
as individual private property.
The four project zones covered in , totalling approximately 
villages, were in Abengourou, Daloa, Bonoua/Alépé and Soubré (see
Figure ).
Analysis of Gbagbo regime delimitation and registration
Table I compares and contrasts the four zones. What does this informa-
tion reveal about the government’s choice of pilot zones, and about the
political or partisan logic, if any, that guided demarcation and land
registration?
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The project areas were all politically accessible areas in southern Côte
d’Ivoire (given the absence of the government in the north due to the
political-military crisis) in which the FPI had either partisan control or
a political foothold in a pro-FPI minority. The last column of Table I
shows that two of the targeted zones, Bonoua/Alepe and Daloa, were
areas of high partisan support for the FPI. Abengourou split its vote in
 between the PDCI and the FPI, but voted for the FPI in .
Soubré was a PDCI stronghold. Here, the PNTGER project built upon
Figure  Map of the four zones of PNGTER village demarcation.
Source: Map redrawn by Mina Moshkeri from Republique Côte d’Ivoire,
Direction Foncier Rural, <www.foncierural.ci>, ...
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TA B L E I
Comparison of – village delimitation cases
Regions
‘villages
propres’
delimited
– (no.)
no. of villages
rattachés
named; no. of
campements
Timing
of in-
migrant
inﬂux
In-migrants, %
total
population*
Source of migrants’
derived land rights
Level of land
rights
contestation
c. 
Village hierarchy
of s
conﬁrmed?
Department-
level electoral
wins (by party)**
Abengourou.
 sous-
préfectures
  villages
rattachés, 
camps.
% of total
are rattachés
s-
s
% chieﬂy hierarchy;
uncontested sales;
tenancy and wage
labour relations
very low accentuated PDCI (
leg.), FPI (
pres., 
pres.)
Bonoua/
Alépé
 sous-
préfectures
  villages
rattachés, 
camps.
% are
rattachés
s,
s-
s
over % self-settled
w/ government’s post-
hoc ratiﬁcation in
s
medium conﬁrmed (auton-
omy of some in-
migrant villages is
conﬁrmed)
FPI (,
)
Daloa
 sous-
préfecture
  villages
rattachés, over
 camps.
s
and
s
–% lineage heads and state
agents, weak tutorat
relations
very high accentuated FPI (,
)
Soubré
 sous-
préfecture
  villages
rattachés, over
 camps.
% of total
are rattachés
s,
s
% state agents,
w/ village chiefs’
consent; weak tutorat
relations from s
which had fallen into
disuse
very high inverted: existing
village auton-
omies overturned
PDCI (,
)
Total
 sous-
préfectures
  villages
rattachés
over 
camps.
* First three rows from Bouquet (: ). ** By departmental results for Dec.  legislatives,  presidential, and presidential (nd round) of 
Oct. , Bouquet (: , , ), Bassett (: ). Source: Author’s notes from village demarcation project collection; see also notes in Table.
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the support base of a local pro-FPI autochthonous minority. Three of the
four were PFR project zones, so groundwork for village delimitation and
land adjudication had already been laid. Northern departments were
absent from the list: the Gbagbo government could not access the
rebel-controlled North until after ; it was a region hostile to the
FPI and was also a region in which there was resistance to land
certiﬁcation.
The project zones were heterogeneous in terms of critical settlement
history variables: the timing of in-migration, demographic balance
between ethnic insiders and outsiders, and level of contestation over
land rights, as summarised in Table I. In general, timing of in-migration
is earlier in the east, having taken place in the colonial period, than it is
in the west. In the west, the migratory in-ﬂows were more recent – they
happened in the post-colonial period – and the demographic weight of
the in-migrants (ethnic outsiders) is higher. Levels of contestation over
land rights were also much higher in the west than they were in the east
(as discussed above).
A review of approximately half of the  village dossiers prepared by
PNTGER in – offers evidence of the government’s commitment to
give pouvoir décisif aux autochtones in the Abengourou, Soubré and Daloa
project zones. In Bonoua/Alépé, the land-use rights of long-settled in-
migrants were shored up. The village enquêtes conﬁrm the heavy insist-
ence on documenting ﬁrst-comer rights, and conﬁrming their primacy
through the public process of documentation and recording (in
writing) individuals’ consent to the ofﬁcial record. Enquêtes clearly differ-
entiated between land-owning villages and subordinate, non-owning vil-
lages (ofﬁcialising status of ‘village without land’ or ‘village installed
within the territory of village X’ in Abengourou and Bonoua/Alépé,
and of village rattaché in Daloa and Soubré). In ‘landless villages’ and vil-
lages rattachés, male household heads signed (or gave ﬁngerprints) to
foreswear any claim to customary land rights of ownership. This ofﬁcia-
lised hierarchical relationships among villages and among residents of
the village territories.
It is remarkable that in Soubré, this effect was achieved through inver-
sion of the prevailing administrative status quo. In-migrants’ status was
demoted in order to elevate the autochthones. Administratively recog-
nised, autonomous villages established in the s, mostly Baoulé,
were demoted to the status of campements subordinated to ofﬁcially
recognised Bakwé villages. One marker of the in-migrants’ reversal-of-
fortune was the renaming of villages: Baoulé or northern-sounding
village names replaced by Bakwé names.
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Because enquêtes historiques of villages were aimed at establishing auto-
chthony or ﬁrst-comer rights, settlement history was critical. Each village
dossier contains answers to the  questions that made up the village
history survey. Recorded answers are short and tend toward the formu-
laic. The ofﬁcial village histories locate the origins of almost all of the
autochthonous villages deep in the pre-colonial period – going back to
the s, s or s. Histories include accounts of relocations,
especially for villages in the west (which are attributed to the search
for better sites) and the date at which the settlement was érigé en village
(i.e. ofﬁcially granted ‘village’ status) by the colonial or Ivoirian admin-
istration. Village histories record non-political and naturalised
accounts of village limits, referring to a river, creek, bas-fonds, or the
long history of entretien des pistes, roads or boundaries between villages.
Mentions of disputes, boundary changes, administrative divisions, etc.
do not appear. Agreement on village boundaries through this process
was followed by investment in actually demarcating the villages.
Approximately , geocoded bornes were set in place under the
Gbagbo regime.
Ofﬁcial village histories tell the story of the land rights that the
Gbagbo government sought to afﬁrm in its implementation of Law
–. They recounted ‘usable histories’ that supported the govern-
ment’s vision of Law –.
In December , a new Programme National de Sécurisation Foncier
Rural (PNSFR) was launched to spearhead an ambitious expansion of
the village delimitation and land registration programme, with World
Bank and EU funding. It elaborated a plan for mass communication
and sensibilisation about Law –. In , Desiré Zalo, then
Director of the Direction du Foncier Rural (DFR), reported at an
Abidjan conference that  villages (out of a total of , in Côte
d’Ivoire) had been delimited so far, that  were in the process of
delimitation, and that  were scheduled for delimitation in .
The ﬁnal balance sheet for village delimitation and land certiﬁcation
under the Gbagbo government was as follows: approximately  village
delimitations (covering . million hectares of territory) were com-
pleted, and  CFs had been issued. Of these CFs,  (% of
the total) were issued in Abengourou and Agnibilikrou,  in Soubré
(%) and  in Daoukro (%). The remaining  CFs were scattered
around the south. Only  CFs (%) were issued in Gbagbo’s home
region. Most of the certiﬁed parcels are small- to medium-sized by
smallholder standards. Approximately % of the certiﬁed parcels in
Abengourou and % of the parcels in Soubré were under  hectares.
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A few CFs for very large holdings were issued to political dignitaries in
the West.
The Abengourou region, the only region in which more than a few
CFs were issued, was surely the easiest place to certify parcel ownership,
given the generally low levels of land tension, long and uncontroversial
settlement histories (see Table I), relatively wealthy landholders by
Ivoirian standards (Gastellu , ), and the historically high
levels of literacy and rural prosperity which characterise this region.
Chauveau & Colin () commented that land certiﬁcation was
easiest and progressed furthest where it was least needed, either to miti-
gate conﬂict or promote land transactions. Daloa and Soubré make this
point by way of counter-example: conﬂict levels were high and land cer-
tiﬁcation stalled.
Decentralisation under the Gbagbo regime
The Gbagbo regime’s land agenda was integrated into a broader vision
of state restructuring that would promote localism, autochtonie and
ethnic prerogative. The government undertook to remould chefferie
law to create a chieftaincy hierarchy that would be comprised of
already existing, ﬁrst-level chefs de village (members of the CVGFR), com-
plemented by second-level chefs de tribu, third-level chefs de canton and
fourth-level chefs de province (at the departmental level). Gbagbo’s
Minister of the Interior, Désiré Tagro, undertook consultations ‘with
kings and traditional chiefs’ to promote the ofﬁcial effort to ‘bringing
back the old structures’ (remet en scène l’ancienne organisation).
An elaborate plan for reorganising territorial administration furth-
ered this vision of restoring local prerogative and valorising communal
initiative. In , a ‘strategy for decentralisation and development
(aménagement) of the national territory’ had been adopted by the Côte
d’Ivoire Donors’ Roundtable. It formalised the goal of total ‘communa-
lisation’ of the country – i.e. conversion of all sous-préfectures to communes,
so that each would have its own elected government. This idea lay
dormant until , when the Gbagbo government introduced a decen-
tralisation strategy to be enacted through a series of laws and decrees in
, , ,  and  that went even further than the 
proposals in enlarging and deepening the scope of decentralisation
(Traoré ). A  law (implemented in ) suppressed the
old ‘communautés rurales’ and created new political jurisdictions – includ-
ing villes, departments, districts and regions – and a new administrative
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hierarchy. As Traoré (: ) describes it, this ‘marked the massive cre-
ation of new communes and new departments … In effect, by decree,
the number of departments increased from  to  and the number
of communes in the country went from  to ,, thus achieving
the almost complete communalisation of the national territory.’
Communes – some of them large villages – were given ﬁnancial auton-
omy and a mandate to organise collective life, promote local develop-
ment, modernise the countryside [le monde rural], and manage land
and other local resources. This ‘émittement territorial’ (breaking up of
the national territory into ever smaller units) was supposed to create
, jobs for new agents municipaux to be hired by local elected politi-
cians (Traoré : ).
Possibilities for effective realisation of Gbagbo’s vision of a new state
architecture – one in which the local power-holders were strengthened,
ethnic institutions were valorised, and resources and prerogative were
devolved to the local level – were undermined by a broader crisis of
state and economy after . Gbagbo lost the disputed October
 national elections to Ouattara. In April  Gbagbo was ﬁnally
dislodged from power through military action by the Ouattara-aligned
Forces Nouvelles rebellion assisted by international action.
I V . L A N D P O L I T I C S U N D E R O U A T T A R A : T A B L E S T U R N E D
Under the Ouattara government, the tables were turned. Ouattara’s
election in  and installation in ofﬁce in April  represented a
clear victory for those defending the rights of in-migrants in southern
Côte d’Ivoire, and clear renunciation of the autochthony-promoting
vision of Gbagbo and the FPI. The new government acted decisively
to recentralise state power and to use possibilities inherent in the
 land law to achieve a new set of objectives.
Chauveau & Colin () describe a brief initial impulse on the part
of the Ouattara government to discard the  land law, or to revise it
completely. In , the government announced that Law – still
stood, but with two reforms. One prolonged the period of application
of Law – to . The second revised the nationality code to make
naturalisation easier. The FPI (absent from the legislature due to a
boycott of legislative elections) and elements of its strong regional con-
stituency in the west protested the nationality law in strongest terms.
Laurent Fologo, an FPI ﬁrebrand, excoriated the Ouattara government
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for undertaking to ‘by the wave of a magic wand [through naturalisation
law], expropriate the land of Ivioriens’.
Implementation of the  land tenure law remained a priority of
Ouattara’s backers in the EU and World Bank, surely because they sub-
scribed to the general consensus that land problems had played a key
role in fomenting devastating civil conﬂict in Côte d’Ivoire, and
because they saw registration and titling as clearing the way for large-
scale investment in agriculture. Chauveau & Colin (: –) criti-
cised the donors for maintaining ‘a naive faith in land titles’ and
seeing the land cadastre ‘as the holy grail’. Donors pledged about
% of the estimated cost of delimiting all of Côte d’Ivoire’s , vil-
lages, setting up CVGFRs, and issuing the estimated , CFs that
would be necessary to complete the task. As part of this effort, the EU-
and World Bank-funded PRSFR was resurrected in  as the
Programme d’Appui à la Relance des Filières Agricoles de Côte d’Ivoire
(PARFACI). This relance called for the improvement of the legal frame-
work, training of actors involved in implementing the [land] law, secur-
isation of village lands by delimitation of terroirs villageois, the creation of
a digital cadastre (Système d’Information Foncière) and the relaunching of
the implementation (mise en oeuvre) of the  land law (Leroy et al.
).
Yet during Ouattara’s ﬁrst mandate (–), the Ivoirian gov-
ernment did not embrace these priorities. Ambitions for general land
certiﬁcation and private land titling were restrained. Much land-
related conﬂict still simmered in the rural areas. In the West, where
, people were killed in land-related violence in –, the
ﬂames of civil war had barely subsided. Land-related violence continued
throughout ,  and . Activism to implement (or indeed, to
revoke) Law – could have stirred up conﬂict that would be
difﬁcult to contain in southern Côte d’Ivoire. In northern Côte
d’Ivoire, to promote Law – would have been to antagonise core
loyalists. The overriding objectives of the Ouattara government in
– were to tamp down civil unrest, protect its partisans in the
rural and urban areas, and maintain control over the national territory.
Under the ﬁrst Ouattara government, the political possibilities inher-
ent in Law – were used most concertedly to promote state-build-
ing objectives, rather than the donor’s objectives of land titling and
promotion of land markets. The government’s priorities were visible
in three domains. First, in the domain of land certiﬁcation, the govern-
ment developed the legal/bureaucratic machinery (disposatif legal)
required to respond to individual demands for land certiﬁcation and
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titling, rather than pushing for state-led titling (except in two local
zones). Second, the main thrust of the village delimitation process was
redeﬁned. Under Gbagbo, the process had been led by PNTGER and
the Ministry of Agriculture, and was aimed at allocating and securing
autochthones’ land rights. Under Ouattara it was placed under the
control of the Ministry of the Interior and harnessed to the ‘redeploy-
ment of the state’ and rebuilding of the territorial administration in
war-torn western Côte d’Ivoire. Third, in the domain of decentralisa-
tion, Gbagbo strove to create a decentralised system anchored at the
grassroots in local autochthonous communities and CVGFRs. The
Ouattara government undertook a decisive recentralisation of authority.
Land certiﬁcation, –
Demand-driven certiﬁcation
Throughout almost all of the national territory, the Ouattara regime
adopted a laissez-faire approach to land certiﬁcation, waiting for
demands for land registration to percolate up from commercially
minded actors and investors. Demand-driven land certiﬁcation was
highly localised and concentrated in zones of new inward investment.
Large-scale investors pushed some land certiﬁcation. Foreign corporate
investors covered the costs of issuing Certiﬁcats Fonciers Collectifs (CFCs)
to a few villages adjacent to land concessions destined for palm oil and
sugar plantations, in order to clarify boundaries. In Aboisso, the
Ministry of Agriculture promoted the certiﬁcation of outgrowers’ planta-
tions on palm oil schemes (with costs of the CF deducted from producers’
income by the millers). There was a similar case in Tabou. Yet the main
drivers on the demand-side were what Tarrouth & Colin () call cadres
acquéreurs, or the acquiring salaried class or more generally, the national
urban elite. Of a total of  CFs covering a total of , hectares
issued between  and April ,  (%), accounting for a
land area of , ha, were for parcels within an – km radius
from Abidjan – in Agboville, Lagunes, Alépé. The average parcel size in
Agboville was  ha. Much of the investment was going into the creation
of hévéa (rubber) plantations.
State-led certiﬁcation
State-led land certiﬁcation continued in two local areas. Most was con-
centrated in EU- and WB-funded project zones in Abengourou and in
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the Soubré dam project zone. In Abengourou, an EU-funded registra-
tion project aimed at issuing , CFs in sous-prefectures delimited
by PNTGER in . By April ,  CFs had been issued in
Abengourou and Agnibilekrou (with average parcel sizes of  and 
ha, respectively), with costs of certiﬁcation covered by the international
donors. The Abidjan hinterland (the zone of demand-led certiﬁcation)
and Abengourou-Agnibilekou (the zone of state-led certiﬁcation)
accounted for over three-quarters of all CFs issued as of April .
There was a secondary zone of land-certiﬁcation in the conﬂict epi-
centre around Duékoué in the Far West. The government’s land certiﬁ-
cation project was ﬁnanced by the African Development Bank (ADB). By
April  about  CFs had been issued in Duékoué and its surround-
ing villages. By September , about  applications (dossiers) were
in various stages of processing. The Duékoué projects were surely
aimed at stabilisation and re-establishing order in this zone.
Critics of the government’s slow process overall on the certiﬁcation
front argued that the lengthy ( steps from the beginning of the certiﬁ-
cation process to the actual issuance of a land title) and costly registra-
tion process discouraged smallholders from seeking certiﬁcation
(Varlet et al. : , ). There was some urgency to the matter:
under Law – and its  extension, land not certiﬁcated by
 will be considered ‘sans maître’ or ownerless and will become prop-
erty of the state.
Village delimitation in the far west
During Ouattara’s ﬁrst mandate, the goal of using village delimitation to
institutionalise the primacy of autochthonous land and political rights
was dropped. Processes of village delimitation and land registration
were disassociated. Under Ouattara from –, security
and state-building logics drove the agenda. Village delimitation was
employed as a tool rebuilding the territorial administration in the war-
torn West.
In , a government ordinance speciﬁed procedures for delimiting
village territories. Shift from the term terroir to the term territoire sig-
nalled a shift away from the land-use and tenure concerns of the PFR
and Gbagbo periods, and to a preoccupation with administrative-
territorial control. The Ministry of the Interior replaced the Ministry
of Agriculture as the lead agency. With ﬁnancing from the ADB, the gov-
ernment undertook village delimitation in the Far West. A large part of
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the effort was focused on the critical border-crossing sous-préfecture of
Toulepleu, where  village territories were delimited during Ouattara’s
ﬁrst mandate.
Village delimitation was accompanied by the appointment of village
chiefs. An urgent priority was to empower local chiefs who could arbi-
trate on land conﬂicts (backed up by the prefectoral corps) between
war refugees and those who had occupied the land in their absence.
Village demarcation and the appointment of chiefs were measures
aimed at re-establishing order, securing ‘local cohesion’ and encour-
aging the return of the refugees.
Recentralisation under Ouattara
A September  ordinance reorganising the territorial administration
was followed in March  by the suppression of  communes,
thus reversing Gbagbo’s policy of communalisation totale. ‘[The govern-
ment] believes that  communes were created for political reasons
and that they are not economically viable. The remaining  commu-
nes will stay.’ Villages were reattached to existing communes. Notre
Voie, the FPI newspaper, reported bitterly that a Gbagbo regime
‘policy that had been greeted enthusiastically by populations, offering
them chance to ‘take their own destiny in hand’, had been ‘killed in
embryo … Under Ouattara, Côte d’Ivoire has turned its back on
decentralisation.’
Districts with their own governors, another product of Gbagbo’s
restructuring of the national political and administrative structure,
were also eliminated. In a  meeting with the prefectoral corps
held at the presidential palace in Abidjan, Ouattara announced that
he was not convinced that the district level of government was
needed. The press announced ‘the death of the districts’. According
to press reports, this was welcomed by the prefects who had viewed
the district governors as compromising their mandate.
A new chefferie law, passed in , retained the four-tiered chieﬂy
hierarchy in some regions, but not others. In Gagnoa, all of the hierarch-
ical structure disappeared, leaving only the chefs de village. The Varlet
report (Varlet et al. : ) explained that the goal of the government
was to ‘stabilise the chefferie’. Chiefs remain representatives of the state
at the local level (village and canton), nominated by sous-préfets (some-
times after a local election), appointed ofﬁcially by the Ministry of the
Interior, and removable only with the permission of the administration.
S H I F T I N G V I S I O N S O F P R O P E R T Y
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000198
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.160.29.105, on 01 Apr 2019 at 13:48:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
As for the village-level land committees, the CVGFR, the conventional
wisdom in the administrative services responsible for land certiﬁcation
in  was that these were not permanent local institutions. ‘They
will die along with the CFs’ (i.e. when the CF is transformed into a
land title).
Ouattara’s ﬁrst term in ofﬁce ended in October . During this
time, the implementation of land policy served a state logic of extending
territorial control more than the market-making logic envisioned by the
IFIs, or the smallholder securisation logic that is of most concern to
NGOs. A great deal of land conﬂict continued to simmer in the localities
of Côte d’Ivoire, including conﬂicts between communities over ‘autoch-
thonous rights’, between communities and the state, between investors
and communities, and between autochthonous landholders and those
claiming to hold ceded land rights.
C O N C L U S I O N
The adoption of a new land law in Côte d’Ivoire in  has been inter-
preted as a decisive commitment to building a true land market. The
argument here is that in fact, for the last two decades, the goals of
freeing markets and facilitating transactions among market actors
have often been tangential to the domestic political drivers and to the
most immediate effects of reform. The Ivoirian case underscores the
extent to which the politics of land titling and registration implicates,
and is even deﬁned by, political questions, rather than purely techno-
cratic or narrowly market-focused ones.
Under Gbagbo and during Ouattara’s ﬁrst term in ofﬁce, land law
reforms, in both content and implementation, were instruments in
larger political struggles for control of the national territory and the
national trajectory. Land law reform revolved around questions of citi-
zenship rights (autochthony vs. user rights), state structure (decentralisa-
tion and political status of the local community) and state sovereignty
(state control over population and territory), rather than politically
neutral market-making as imagined by some international promoters
of land law reform. The Ivoirian experience is a useful point of reference
for understanding land politics in cases such as Kenya and Uganda,
where many of the same tensions and issues animate national and subna-
tional struggles over land policy and land rights.
A counter-trend is visible across a zone of a radius of about  km
from Abidjan, where registration and titling is driven by private investors
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who want to acquire land, mostly for hévéa plantations and mostly about
 ha in size (as described above). Much of the land in this zone was
extracted from the customary tenure domain in the –
period for the creation of foreign and state plantations. Colin was
describing this process when he observed that Law – was acceler-
ating processes of class formation in the agrarian sector ‘through select-
ive implementation of the law … on a case-by-case basis in order to
secure land transfers beneﬁtting national elites (through purchase) or
national or foreign agro-industrial ﬁrms (through long-term leases on
certiﬁed and then titled land) (Colin : ). It does indeed
square with the market-promoting vision embraced by the liberal pro-
moters of land law reform. The question going forward is whether this
will remain an enclave phenomenon, or whether it will diffuse into
zones that are now under neo-customary forms of tenure. It remains pos-
sible that larger political-economic changes or land conﬂicts will swamp
and subvert processes of privatisation and commodiﬁcation.
A more immediate question has to do with the future of Law –
itself. Under current law, holdings not certiﬁed by  become the
property of the state. Many insiders in Côte d’Ivoire believe that this
will never happen, that the law will be amended, and that the current
provisions are only there to pressure smallholders to seek CFs. One
could cite the disciplinary tone of the député (MP) in Divo, N’Guessan
Denis, who told people in  to ‘immatriculate your lands before
, because if you don’t, they will become the property of the state’.
Under Ouattara’s second term, which began in November , gov-
ernment policy has been to accelerate the land certiﬁcation process.
Even so, it is possible that  will arrive, and that the majority of
small-scale landholders in Côte d’Ivoire will ﬁnd themselves in the
same legal position as in , before the land law reform process
began. Yet in contrast to , the government’s control over most
land across the national territory will be extended, strengthened and
more ﬁrmly rooted in law. State actors will be able to make long-
term leases with investors throughout most of the national territory. In
this situation, the security of most small-scale users’ land rights will be
determined by the political character of the regime in power, interac-
tions between national and local actors and agendas, and the more
general balance of state-society relations at the time. These larger polit-
ical forces have gone far in determining the character of land law and
policy to date.
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. For example, Chauveau (, ); Banegas & Losch (); Bassett (); Akindès
(); Marshall-Fratani (); Babo & Droz (); Boone (); Bah (); Bouquet
(); McGovern () and Leroy et al. (). See also Crook (, ).
. See Leroy et al. (); Colin (, ); Ruf (); Tarrouth & Colin (); Colin &
Tarrouth ().
. Ibid.
. See Dozon () and note .
. See Chauveau et al. (: ); Stamm (); Lavigne Delville ().
. Zalo (: ) refers to a different time frame in offering a balance sheet. He describes the
PFR (and the PNGTER, presumably) as rolled out in three phases in nine zones over the –
 period: ‘Over the course of this period, ,, ha were delimited, , parcels were
marked out (levées), and  villages were covered.’
. See Chauveau et al. ().
. See note .
. Law – was not the direct or intended result of the PFR or PNGTER. Chauveau (: )
explains that although the PFR had been seen as a step in the process of formulating new land legis-
lation, (a) it did not include a plan to require formal registration of land certiﬁcates, and (b) it was
still underway, having just scaled up from seven to nine project zones, in . Even so, in , the
methodologies and procedures of the PFR and PNGTER were integrated into ofﬁcial procedures for
land certiﬁcation. This was formalised under Ouattara in decree no. –.
. Stamm () reported that the draft legislation contained a clause that would have revoked
the user rights of those who could not prove that their land had been ‘brought into use’ (mise en
valeur), but that this provision was withdrawn early on.
. Some observers believe that some members of the national assembly were eager to acquire
titles and invest.
. See Babo & Droz ().
. Akindès ().
. Chauveau & Colin (:  inter alia). See Dagrou (: , n. ).
. In fact the law provided for the possibility that an Ivoirian could receive a certiﬁcate and title
for land in a region in which he or she was a non-autochthone. Foreigners were not barred from
receiving land certiﬁcates, but titles to this land are established in the name of the state
(Chauveau ; Boone ).
. Zalo (: ); Dagrou (: ); Colin ().
. See also Boni (n.d.).
. See Varlet et al. (: , ). Law – did not specify how village boundaries were to be
delimited. So on this, the PNTGER programme operated in a vide juridique (juridical void) that was
not ﬁlled until the Ouattara regime issued decree –. On the PFR process, see Colin et al.
(); Lavigne Delville ().
. Varlet et al. ().
. The extent to which the ‘autochthony’ was/is a bone of contention (i.e. the distinction
between autochthone and ﬁrst-comer, the question of who is autochthonous, and the matter of
the land rights of autochthones versus in-migrants) varies across space and sometimes along other
dimensions in Côte d’Ivoire, partly as a function of settlement history and variations in land
tenure regime. See Boone (). See also Dozon (); Affou Yapi (); Gastellu ();
Diaby (); Lesourd (); Colin et al. (); Babo (); Kouamé (); MacLean ().
. The phrase in quotes is from Chauveau et al. (: ). About  PNTGER village dossiers
were consulted in Abidjan in  and . The DFR holds a collection.
. There is silence around the history of French wars of paciﬁcation and forced regrouping and
resettlement of populations in the West. See Dozon (). Enqueteurs recorded the respondents’
information about when the sites were érigé en village. Answers from Daloa included, for example,
‘By the Commandant de Cercle in ’, and in Soubré or Bonoua, ‘By sous-préfet or préfet so-and-so
in  …’.
. Zalo (). Numbers averaged about – per village territory.
. Club Union Africaine Côte d’Ivoire ().
. In November , Minister of Agriculture Mamadou Sangafowa Coulibaly reported that 
villages had been delimited and  CFs delivered (apparently out of  requests/initiations of the
process). ‘Sangafowa Coulibaly: “La loi sur le foncier n’a pas été changée”,’ Frat.Info (Abidjan), Nov.
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, <allafrica.com>, accessed ... Varlet et al. (: , ) reported that ,, ha of
village land was delimited in the  years of the PFR and PNGTER projects.
. This is according to the Direction Foncier Rural tally consulted in April  for the number of
CFs issued by the end of . See also Club Union Africaine Côte d’Ivoire ().
. That is, two in Lakota, two in Issia. The government was ready to issue CFs in Daloa in  and
, where  villages had been enquêtés and  were bouclés, or completed. However this was
aborted in October  when the CVGFRs of the three targeted villages in Gboguhé sous-
préfecture all resigned en masse on the grounds that the -year period of Law – had expired
and they feared that the state would use this as a pretext for expropriation of their land (Club
Union Africaine Côte d’Ivoire : , ).
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